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London

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For 40 years Dorsey's London office has served as the Firm's gateway to the U.K. and Continental Europe. Located in one of the world's leading financial centers, the office offers a wide range of experience and expertise serving international clients with business interests in the U.K. and Continental Europe, as well as U.K. and European clients active in the Americas, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

London attorneys work closely with colleagues across Dorsey's offices in North America, Continental Europe, and Asia. The office combines deep local market knowledge with the resources of a global platform to support clients wherever business takes them.

Whether your enterprise plans to raise capital, borrow or lend funds, develop technology, grow through acquisitions or joint ventures, or needs to respond to a government investigation or resolve a high stakes dispute, our London team can help you achieve your goals.

Our Practices in London

Our London attorneys advise clients on M&A, capital markets, private equity, commercial litigation and international arbitration, banking and finance, corporate trust, real estate, employment, intellectual property, tax, and regulatory investigations and compliance. We have particular strength in cross-border matters spanning the U.K., the E.U., and the U.S., supporting clients from early-stage growth through complex multi-jurisdictional transactions, disputes, and regulatory investigations where the U.K., E.U., and U.S. regimes intersect.

In the Community

Giving back is an important part of our London office culture. We participate in the Sutton Trust's Pathways to the Professions Programme, hosting students for a week-long placement that offers a behind-the-scenes look at life in an international law firm and helps broaden access to legal careers. Our team also takes part in the annual London Legal Walk and fundraising initiatives that support organizations providing free legal advice and advocacy to people across the U.K.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are London attorneys licensed outside of England?

Yes. Our London team includes lawyers qualified in England & Wales, New Zealand, India, and the United States, providing clients with an integrated team on cross-border transactions.

What languages do Dorsey's London attorneys speak?

Our London team reflects a truly global community, with lawyers and business professionals speaking more than a dozen languages, including Arabic, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Korean, Italian, French, Gujarati, Farsi, Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, Marathi, Norwegian, Nepali, and Hebrew. This breadth of language capability enables the Dorsey London office to work seamlessly across jurisdictions in conjunction with other Dorsey offices and correspondent firms across Europe, the Nordics, the Middle East, India, and beyond.

Does the London office help clients resolve disputes in arbitration?

Yes. Dorsey’s London lawyers help clients resolve disputes before the European Court of Justice, courts in England & Wales, and other jurisdictions, and advise on ad hoc arbitrations and international arbitrations conducted under AAA, ICC, LCIA, and UNCITRAL rules.

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Articles

Court of Appeal Clarifies the Scope of “Public Domain” Carve-Outs in NDAs

August 24, 2026

In Illiquidx Ltd v Altana Wealth Ltd and others [2026] EWCA Civ 874, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against findings that Altana and its consultant, Brevent, had misused confidential information belonging to Illiquidx. The Court of Appeal referred to the established legal meaning of the expression “public domain” and held that, where a professionally drafted NDA uses such an expression, the parties will ordinarily be taken to have intended its established legal meaning in the law of confidence, unless the contract or surrounding circumstances indicate otherwise. Background Illiquidx, an advisory and broking boutique firm specialising in Venezuelan distressed debt, entered into a joint venture with Altana and Brevent to explore setting up a fund targeting undervalued Venezuelan sovereign debt. The parties signed an NDA to protect the business opportunity during their discussions. The joint venture broke down in November 2019 without a fund being launched. Eight months later, in July 2020, Altana set up its own fund pursuing the same opportunity, leading Illiquidx to sue for breach of confidence and misuse of trade secrets. At first instance, Mr Justice Rajah found in Illiquidx’s favour on both claims. Altana and Brevent appealed. There were three key issues for the Court of Appeal. Judgment 1. Did “public domain” bear its established legal meaning? The NDA provided that its confidentiality restrictions did not apply to information that was already “in the public domain” at the time it was supplied. Altana and Brevent argued that this should be read broadly to cover information that was available or disclosed without being subject to a duty of confidentiality. On that reading, limited marketing of the fund concept to a handful of prospective investors could have been enough to remove the information from the protection of the NDA. The Court of Appeal rejected that interpretation. It stated that “public domain” has a well-established legal meaning in the law of confidence. It refers to information that is so widely accessible that it cannot realistically be regarded as confidential (per Goff LJ in Attorney General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at [282]). The Court of Appeal held that where a professionally drafted contract uses an expression with a well-established legal meaning, the parties are presumed to have intended that meaning to apply unless the wording of the contract or the surrounding circumstances indicate otherwise. The Court found nothing in the NDA (including in its definition of “Confidential Information”) to displace that presumption. A broad definition of “Confidential Information” did not automatically imply a correspondingly broad meaning of “public domain”. They were two separate terms of the contract which had to be construed according to their own wording. 2. Did independent knowledge and third-party source carve-outs apply? Altana and Brevent also argued that certain information fell outside the NDA’s restrictions because the information was known to them independently, or had been obtained from a third party who was not subject to an obligation of confidence. Although these arguments had not been properly advanced at trial, the Court considered them on their merits. The Court held that none of the examples relied upon established independent knowledge of the specific opportunity or fund structure disclosed by Illiquidx. 3. Was the information in fact in the public domain? Altana and Brevent also challenged the trial judge’s factual finding that neither the overall business opportunity nor the detailed information underlying it was in the public domain. They relied on marketing materials Illiquidx had itself circulated, press coverage of Venezuela’s distressed debt, and evidence that certain individual facts (such as which bonds could lawfully be traded) were publicly known. The Court upheld the trial judge’s findings. Illiquidx’s marketing materials had been shared with around 200 potential investors by Illiquidx, Altana, and Brevent for the purposes of the joint venture. The documents were marked “strictly confidential” or “private and confidential”. This was intended to be a confidential opportunity to be presented to serious potential investors. The presentation was not put on the Illiquidx’s website or sent to the wider newsletter circulation of Illiquidx or Altana. It remained relatively secret because it was not circulated more widely. It was not intended to be, and was not, available to potential competitors to Illiquidx. Sharing information with a limited group of investors in circumstances where the information was intended to remain confidential did not make that information generally accessible. The Court also rejected an argument based on the absence of evidence as to what the recipients had subsequently done with the material, characterising it as an impermissible attempt to reverse the burden of proof, which rested on the party asserting that the information was in the public domain. The Court upheld the finding that the fact that individual elements of the business opportunity were publicly available did not mean that the particular information communicated by Illiquidx was itself in the public domain. For example, although facts such as the distressed nature of Venezuelan debt and the possibility of lawfully trading certain bonds despite sanctions were publicly known, the evidence did not identify any publicly available source disclosing the opportunity to establish a sanctions-compliant fund to exploit that debt. The significance lay in the particular collation and presentation of the information to formulate the business opportunity. The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the specific opportunity disclosed by Illiquidx was not generally accessible, notwithstanding that some of its constituent facts were publicly available. Key Points to Note The judgment is a helpful reminder of several practical points for businesses that share sensitive information under an NDA: “Public domain” has a legal meaning, and it will ordinarily carry that meaning unless the contract or surrounding circumstances indicate otherwise. Where an NDA carves out information “in the public domain” without further definition, it will ordinarily be understood as referring to information so generally accessible that it cannot realistically be regarded as confidential. It does not necessarily extend to information that has merely been shared with someone who owes no duty of confidentiality. Parties wanting a broader carve-out than the established legal meaning provides, for example, one triggered by disclosure to a single third party, need to draft that outcome expressly into the NDA. The scope of each provision depends on its own wording. The burden of proving that information was in the public domain rests with the party asserting it. A defendant cannot simply point to limited disclosure and infer wider circulation without evidence that that information had in fact become generally accessible. The collation and presentation of publicly available information can itself be confidential. The fact that individual components of a business opportunity are publicly available does not necessarily mean that the particular way in which those components have been collated and presented is itself in the public domain. The Court’s conclusion was fact-sensitive. Whether information has entered the public domain will depend on the circumstances, including the extent and nature of its dissemination and whether it has become generally accessible.

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Articles

Litigation Privilege Does Not Automatically Protect Communications with Funders: The Commercial Court Clarifies the Limits of Privilege in the Context of Litigation Funding

July 20, 2026

Firm Highlights

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.